Key length
The minimum key sizes each source publishes for protecting data until a given year. The rules that apply to you come first, and every figure links to the document it comes from. New to this? Start with why key length matters and which year to enter.
No rules selected, so every source is listed as comparison.
Data encrypted today with RSA or elliptic-curve key exchange and needing secrecy until 2035 can be recorded now and decrypted later if a large quantum computer arrives first.
Any key is only as strong as its handling, because keys are stolen or leaked far more often than they are broken; that exposure is what cryptoperiods limit.
Equivalent classical security strength
Public-key parameter size is not the same thing as security strength. This table puts RSA, finite-field Diffie–Hellman or DSA, elliptic curves, hashes and an ideal symmetric key on the same scale. For example, 3072-bit RSA and a 256-bit elliptic curve both map to about 128 security bits.
| Security bits ≈ symmetric key |
RSA modulus | Finite-field DH / DSA modulus / subgroup |
Elliptic-curve key | Collision-resistant hash output |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 80 legacy | 1,024 | 1,024 / 160 | 160–223 | 160 |
| 112 | 2,048 | 2,048 / 224 | 224–255 | 224 |
| 128 | 3,072 | 3,072 / 256 | 256–383 | 256 |
| 192 | 7,680 | 7,680 / 384 | 384–511 | 384 |
| 256 | 15,360 | 15,360 / 512 | 512+ | 512 |
Classical equivalence from NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 5, Table 2. The 80-bit row is legacy only. These are conservative strength categories, not exact attack-cost estimates, and they do not make classical public-key cryptography resistant to a cryptographically relevant quantum computer.
How long to use a key
Key size answers how hard a key is to break; a cryptoperiod answers how long that particular key should remain authorized for use. Cryptoperiods exist because keys are stolen, leaked through bugs in the software around them, or used as signing oracles far more often than they are broken, so the period bounds the damage from a compromise rather than from cryptanalysis. These are NIST’s suggested starting points for rotation, not certificate validity limits or universal mandates. Is the algorithm usually the weak point?
| Key type | Suggested cryptoperiod |
|---|---|
| Signing | |
| Private signature key | 1–3 years |
| Public signature-verification key | Several years; depends on key size |
| Authentication | |
| Symmetric authentication key | Originator use <2 years; recipient use <originator period + 3 years |
| Private authentication key | 1–2 years |
| Public authentication key | 1–2 years |
| Encryption, wrapping and derivation | |
| Symmetric data-encryption key | Originator use <2 years; recipient use <originator period + 3 years |
| Symmetric key-wrapping key | Originator use <2 years; recipient use <originator period + 3 years |
| Symmetric random-bit-generator key | See NIST SP 800-90 |
| Symmetric master or key-derivation key | About 1 year |
| Private key-transport key | <2 years |
| Public key-transport key | 1–2 years |
| Key agreement | |
| Symmetric key-agreement key | 1–2 years |
| Private static key-agreement key | 1–2 years |
| Public static key-agreement key | 1–2 years |
| Private ephemeral key-agreement key | One key-agreement transaction |
| Public ephemeral key-agreement key | One key-agreement transaction |
| Authorization | |
| Symmetric authorization key | <2 years |
| Private authorization key | <2 years |
| Public authorization key | <2 years |
From NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 5, Table 1. NIST says the application and operating environment may justify shorter or longer periods; extending them requires explicit risk consideration. “Originator use” is when the key may protect new data, while “recipient use” is how long it may process already-protected data. An originator-use period is not a certificate lifetime: a two-year signing period does not mean a two-year certificate, and the public keys that verify roots, timestamped signatures and signed software run on a different, much longer clock than the private key that signed them. See What is a cryptoperiod?
- Symmetric
- 128
- Factoring modulus
- 3,072
- Discrete log
- 3,072 / 256
- Elliptic curve
- 256
- Hash
- 256
Signatures: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA
- Symmetric
- 128
- Factoring modulus
- Hybrid only
- Discrete log
- Hybrid only
- Elliptic curve
- Hybrid only
- Hash
- 256
Signatures: ML-DSA-65 or -87, SLH-DSA (192 or 256), LMS or XMSS; classical signatures until end of 2035
- Symmetric
- 128
- Factoring modulus
- 3,072
- Discrete log
- 3,072 / 250
- Elliptic curve
- 250
- Hash
- 256
Signatures: ML-DSA hybrid with a classical signature; SLH-DSA may be used alone
- Symmetric
- 256
- Factoring modulus
- Transition only
- Discrete log
- Transition only
- Elliptic curve
- Transition only
- Hash
- 384
Signatures: ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS for firmware
- Symmetric
- 256
- Factoring modulus
- Retired
- Discrete log
- Retired
- Elliptic curve
- Retired
- Hash
- 384
Signatures: ML-DSA-65 or -87, preferably 87; only ML-DSA-87 approved beyond 2030
| Source | Window | Symmetric ? | Factoring modulus ? | DL key / group ? | Elliptic curve ? | Hash ? | Post-quantum ? | Your key |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NIST1 | 2031 to open | 128 | 3,072 | 3,072 / 256 | 256 | 256 | ML-KEM (FIPS 203) Sig: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA | |
| BSI4 | 2026 to 2032 | 128 | Hybrid only | Hybrid only | Hybrid only | 256 | Hybrid with a classical scheme: ML-KEM-768 or -1024, FrodoKEM-976 or -1344, or Classic McEliece (BSI advised on 1 October 2026 against Classic McEliece in new developments; revision of TR-02102-1 planned for early 2027) Sig: ML-DSA-65 or -87, SLH-DSA (192 or 256), LMS or XMSS; classical signatures until end of 2035 | |
| ANSSI5 | 2031 to open | 128 | 3,072 | 3,072 / 250 | 250 | 256 | Hybrid with a classical scheme: ML-KEM-768 preferred (512 allowed), FrodoKEM-976 preferred; post-quantum recommended for use beyond 2030 Sig: ML-DSA hybrid with a classical signature; SLH-DSA may be used alone | |
| NSA CNSA 2.06 | 2025 to open | 256 | Transition only | Transition only | Transition only | 384 | ML-KEM-1024 Sig: ML-DSA-87; LMS or XMSS for firmware | |
| ASD0 | 2031 to open | 256 | Retired | Retired | Retired | 384 | ML-KEM-768 or -1024, preferably 1024; only ML-KEM-1024 approved beyond 2030 Sig: ML-DSA-65 or -87, preferably 87; only ML-DSA-87 approved beyond 2030 |
All sizes in bits and all are minimums. Grey italic values fall outside the source's own window and show where it last stood. D draft, S superseded edition, 2nd not yet checked against the primary document. The old equation-based estimators are intentionally kept separate from current policy; read why.
References
- NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 5, NIST, 2020-05.
- NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 6 initial public draft, NIST, 2025-12-05, draft.
- NIST IR 8547 initial public draft, NIST, 2024-11-12, draft.
- BSI TR-02102-1, Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths, version 2026-01, BSI, 2026-01-23.
- ANSSI-PG-083, Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, v3.00, ANSSI, 2026-03-20.
- NSA CNSA 2.0 algorithms advisory, NSA, 2025-05-30.
- ASD, Planning for post-quantum cryptography, ASD, 2025-09-22.
How your rules compare
Each line is one source's minimum over the years it covers, with your rules in colour. The shaded band spans the least and most demanding sources and the dashed line is the median.
PQC transition
Where governments have set post-quantum migration dates, how far deployment has come, and how close quantum hardware is to the published estimates for breaking today's public-key cryptography.
Nothing you selected (no jurisdiction) sets a dated post-quantum deadline, so the 2035 horizon most governments use is the one to plan against.
The largest superconducting processor built so far (the kind IBM and Google build) has 1,121 qubits. The smallest recent superconducting design for breaking RSA-2048 needs about 100,000, 89 times as many, and would run for about a month. The largest neutral-atom array holds 6,100 atoms but has not yet been used for computation. The smallest neutral-atom design needs about 11,000 and would run for decades, or about 97 days with about 102,000. Qubit count is only one of the gaps, since an attack also needs error-corrected operations sustained for the whole run, and no machine has yet run error-corrected computation for anything close to that long.
Anything encrypted today with RSA or elliptic-curve key exchange that must stay secret until 2035 can be recorded now and decrypted once such a machine exists, so the planning horizon matters more than the arrival date.
Change the rules or the planning horizon above and this reading updates. What is a qubit? Why act before the machine exists?
Migration deadlines around the world
Which governments have told their organisations when to finish moving to post-quantum cryptography, and how firmly.
Where governments and regulators have published post-quantum dates, where only a sector regulator or a planning requirement exists, and where nothing has been set. Select a country for its instruments; the timeline below has every dated milestone.
Every dated milestone
Each row is one government or regulator; each marker is a date it has set. The earliest one that applies to you is the one to plan against.
Dated obligations and targets from governments and regulators, with the jurisdictions you picked highlighted. Filled markers were checked against the primary document; hollow dashed markers rest on reporting about it. Each year column ends on 31 December, so a marker on a column's right edge means the end of that year.
Earliest migration date in the filtered set: 1 Jan 2027, US national security systems, new acquisitions must support CNSA 2.0. Mandatory. Where several jurisdictions apply, the earliest one is the one to plan against.
Where adoption actually stands
Post-quantum encryption is now the default between browsers and large networks, much less common on the servers behind them, and proving identity with post-quantum algorithms (certificates) has barely started.
Key establishment and authentication are at very different stages, so they are tracked separately. The telemetry figure is a dated snapshot of one network's traffic, not a measure of the whole internet.
Key establishment
Protects confidentiality now against later decryption.
- Algorithm standardizedML-KEM final as FIPS 203, August 2024.
- Protocol specifiedHybrid X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768 and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 for TLS 1.3, published as RFC 10024 in August 2026.
- Default in major librariesOpenSSL 3.5 LTS (April 2025) offers a hybrid X25519MLKEM768 key share by default.
- Majority of browser trafficCloudflare Radar snapshot above.
- Servers behind the edgeAbout 15% of the origin servers Cloudflare connects to support hybrid ML-KEM (September 2026), so the connection from a large network to the site behind it is mostly still classical.
- Required in procurementCISA says agencies should buy only PQC-capable products in four categories: cloud PaaS and IaaS, collaboration software, web browsers and servers, and endpoint security (January 2026). Most still lack post-quantum signatures. FAR rule for contractors not yet proposed.
Authentication
Signatures and certificates. Live authentication only needs to hold until migration, but signatures checked years later need to last longer.
- Algorithms standardizedML-DSA and SLH-DSA final (FIPS 204, 205). FN-DSA (FIPS 206) still in draft.
- Certificate format for the webMerkle Tree Certificates in the IETF PLANTS working group; Chrome and Cloudflare running a feasibility study.
- CA issuanceLet's Encrypt plans an MTC staging environment in late 2026 and production in 2027 (secondary).
- Browser trustChrome plans a separate quantum-resistant root store, with onboarding for more CAs targeted around the third quarter of 2027 (secondary).
- Required by policyUS federal high value assets and high impact systems must move signatures by 31 December 2031 under EO 14412.
Where cryptography lives, and how much of it has moved
Every layer of a system depends on public-key cryptography, and every one of them has to change. Most attention has gone to the first row.
Cryptography runs through an organisation the way networking does, with a use at every layer: the connection, the certificate, the person signing in, the device booting, the service calling another service, the code being trusted, the data on disk, the message, the credential in a wallet. Most of those uses have two halves that move at different speeds. Secrecy (key exchange and encryption) is what an attacker can record today and decrypt later, so it has to move first, and in many places it has. Authenticity (signatures and certificates) only has to hold until a quantum computer exists, but it is anchored in certificates, hardware and standards, so it moves far more slowly. Each item shows both halves, marked S and A. The places that moved first are the ones where one party controls both ends or where the change is a software update; the slow ones are anchored in hardware, in standards bodies, or in mathematics that has no post-quantum equivalent yet.
Transport
Every connection between two machines
Key exchange protects what is sent; authentication proves who is on the other end. Key exchange has moved, authentication mostly has not.
Web identity
How a browser knows it reached the right site
Public certificates cannot simply switch algorithm, so the web is building a different kind of certificate.
People
How users prove who they are
Passkeys and smart cards sign with classical keys and the hardware that holds them is slow to change.
Devices
How a machine proves what it is and what it booted
Attestation and boot chains are anchored in silicon and firmware, which have the longest replacement cycles of anything here.
Workloads
How services prove who they are to each other
Different from devices: identities are short-lived and issued by software, which makes them easier to change once the libraries catch up.
Software supply chain
How code is trusted before it runs
Signatures on code must stay valid for the life of the software, so they are on the earliest government deadlines.
Data at rest
Disks, databases, key stores and backups
The data itself is encrypted with symmetric algorithms that are not at risk; the keys that wrap those keys are the exposure.
Messaging and media
Conversations, mail and streams
Consumer messengers moved first and fastest; email and media protection have not started.
Credentials and privacy
Money, identity documents and private presentation
Several of these rest on mathematics with no post-quantum equivalent yet, so they need new designs rather than new parameters.
What it would take, against what has been built
How far today's quantum computers are from the size needed to break RSA and elliptic-curve keys, on each kind of hardware.
Falling points are published estimates of the physical qubits needed to break the target, and the stepped dashed lines are the largest gate-model devices actually built. Colour is the hardware type, and the only like-for-like comparison is within one colour, because a physical qubit is not the same resource across hardware types. The widely quoted figure of under a million qubits (Gidney, 2025) assumes the most constrained case, superconducting qubits on a planar grid that interact only with their neighbours. Neutral-atom designs move and connect qubits freely, so they need around ten thousand, but their error correction cycles run about a thousand times slower. At that size the attack would run for decades, and finishing in about three months takes about a hundred thousand. Trapped ions share that profile, and the one modern trapped-ion estimate, from IonQ, lands at about twenty thousand. The bracket at the as-of line and the table below show each hardware type's gap in qubit count only. A device's size is not a demonstrated ability to run an attack, and the largest neutral-atom array has not yet been used for computation. Physical qubits are the raw hardware elements, not the reliable logical qubits an attack is written in; the FAQ explains the difference.
| Hardware type | Largest built | Lowest estimate | Gap | Runtime at that size |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Superconducting | 1,121 IBM Condor | under 1M Gidney, May 2025; Surface code on a planar grid | 892× | under a week |
| under 100k Webster et al. (Pinnacle), Feb 2026; Quantum LDPC codes, bounded-range connections | 89× | about a month at 100,000 qubits; a week at about 139,000 | ||
| Neutral atoms | 6,100 Caltech neutral-atom array | 11k Cain et al., Mar 2026; Neutral atoms, reconfigurable | 1.8× | decades for the 11,000 to 14,000-qubit layouts; about 97 days with about 102,000 qubits |
| Trapped ions | 98 Quantinuum Helios | 2,000M Lekitsch et al., Feb 2017; Surface code on a planar grid | 20M× 2017 estimate | about 110 days |
| Photonic | none built | no published estimate | n/a | n/a |
Dates operators set for themselves
Large operators have moved their own targets ahead of the regulatory 2035 horizon.
- Google
Complete post-quantum migration, with authentication prioritised2029
source - Cloudflare
Full post-quantum security, including authentication, across all products2029
source - Microsoft
Early adoption of quantum-safe capabilities, then complete transition of services and products2029 and 2033
source - US federal (EO 14412)
High value assets and high impact systems on PQC key establishmentend of 2030
source - NIST (draft IR 8547)
Quantum-vulnerable algorithms disallowedafter 2035
source
Each date is the operator’s own published commitment and covers its own systems, not its customers.
What the new algorithms cost on the wire
Post-quantum keys and signatures are much bigger than the ones they replace, which is the main reason certificates are the hard part.
Public key and signature or ciphertext sizes in bytes, on a logarithmic scale. These are raw encodings from the standards; certificate and protocol framing add more. Size, more than speed, is what makes post-quantum authentication hard in the WebPKI.
Developments log
The dated record of papers, standards and rules, newest first, so you can see what changed and when.
Findings, standards, policy and operator decisions in the order they happened, each linked to where it was reported. This is where a new paper or rule shows up first, before it is folded into the charts above.
- 2026
- 21 SeptStandardFIPS 140-2 certificates move to the historical listEvery remaining FIPS 140-2 validation became historical, leaving FIPS 140-3 as the only active standard for new federal procurements, with a large backlog of modules still awaiting validation. FedRAMP
- 8 SeptResource estimateIonQ estimates 20,000 trapped ions for a 256-bit elliptic-curve keyA fully compiled estimate on IonQ's Walking Cat architecture: 19,397 physical qubits and about 26 days per attempt against secp256k1, with quantum LDPC codes and a 10⁻⁴ two-qubit error rate. The first trapped-ion figure in the same range as the neutral-atom estimates. Häner, Tripier, Young et al., IonQ
- SeptStandardChina publishes NGCC round 1 candidates84 public-key algorithms and 35 hash algorithms enter first-round evaluation, with the block cipher track still to follow. China is standardising its own post-quantum algorithms rather than adopting the NIST set. Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China
- AugPolicyMAS sets an end-of-decade quantum resilience expectation for financial institutionsSupervisory expectations with milestones rather than a statutory deadline. Monetary Authority of Singapore
- 16 JulPolicySingapore's CSA sets dates for critical information infrastructureMigration plans to CSA by 31 March 2027, quantum-safe procurement from 1 January 2028, and migration complete by 31 December 2031. Cyber Security Agency of Singapore
- 13 JulPolicyDepartment of War suspends CMMC Phase 2Third-party certification, due from 10 November 2026, is paused pending a 60-day review; Phase 1 self-assessments against NIST SP 800-171 remain mandatory. US Department of War
- JulPolicyHKMA publishes first Quantum Preparedness Index resultsHong Kong banks score 2.3 of 10 against a target of 10 by 2030. Hong Kong Monetary Authority
- JulPolicyFINMA Guidance 05/2026 asks Swiss institutions for PQC roadmapsRoadmaps recommended by mid-2027. FINMA (Switzerland)
- JulOperatorOratomic raises a $300M Series A to build a fault-tolerant neutral-atom machineAnnounced in July 2026. Supercomputing News (secondary)
- 24 JunPolicyOMB M-26-15 sets agency plan, inventory and migration phasesPlans due late October 2026, key establishment by 2030, signatures in 2031, the rest by 2035. OMB
- 23 JunPolicyDepartment of War PQC strategyEvery system supports PQC or is phased out by end of 2030, and uses it by end of 2031. DoW CIO
- 22 JunPolicyExecutive Order 14412 pulls US federal dates forwardHigh value assets and high impact systems on PQC key establishment by end of 2030 and signatures by end of 2031, excluding national security systems; contractors only once a FAR rule is final. The White House
- MayResource estimateRSA-2048 on a half-million-qubit modular atomic processorDistributing Shor's algorithm across modules costs only 16% more time than one large module. Xue and Covey
- 31 MarResource estimateElliptic curve keys under 500,000 qubits, minutes of runtimeGoogle withheld the circuits and published a zero-knowledge proof of the resource counts. Babbush et al., Google Quantum AI with Ethereum Foundation and Stanford
- 31 MarResource estimateShor's algorithm with about 10,000 neutral atomsThe smallest layouts trade qubits for runtimes of years to decades; about 26,000 atoms bring an elliptic-curve key down to about 10 days. Cain et al., Oratomic, Caltech and UC Berkeley
- 30 MarStandardCRYPTREC adds ML-KEM to Japan's e-Government recommended ciphersRevision LS-0001-2022R2 lists ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key exchange. CRYPTREC (Digital Agency, MIC, METI)
- 20 MarStandardANSSI publishes version 3.00 of its cryptographic mechanisms guideRSA and finite-field groups at 2048 bits through 2030 and 3072 from 2031; post-quantum mechanisms must be hybridised, except hash-based signatures. ANSSI
- 27 FebStandardChrome sets out its Merkle Tree Certificates pathNo immediate plan to add PQC X.509 certificates to the Chrome Root Store. Google Chrome
- 4 FebPolicyIndia's task force report sets milestones from 2027 to 2033Critical infrastructure first, with PQC the default across communication systems by 2033. DST India, National Quantum Mission
- FebHardwareQuantinuum Helios runs 48 error-corrected logical qubitsA distance-4 concatenated code on 80 of Helios's 98 ions, beyond break-even. Quantinuum
- FebResource estimatePinnacle architecture puts RSA-2048 under 100,000 qubitsUses quantum LDPC codes; needs richer connectivity than a planar grid. Webster et al., Iceberg Quantum
- 23 JanStandardBSI TR-02102-1 2026-01 ends the sole use of classical asymmetric mechanismsClassical key agreement alone until end of 2031 (2030 for very high protection), classical signatures until end of 2035, post-quantum KEMs in hybrid form. BSI
- 23 JanPolicyCISA lists product categories where agencies should buy only PQC-capable productsCloud PaaS and IaaS, collaboration software, web browsers and servers, and endpoint security. CISA
- 20 JanPolicyCommission proposes a NIS2 amendment requiring national PQC transition policiesCOM(2026) 13 would require Member States to include PQC transition policies in their national cybersecurity strategies; the 2030 and 2035 dates appear only in a recital. Not yet adopted. European Commission
- 13 JanPolicyG7 Cyber Expert Group points the financial sector at 2035Gives 2030 to 2032 as an example for critical systems and notes guidance often points to 2035; explicitly non-binding. G7 Cyber Expert Group
- 2025
- 5 DecStandardNIST SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev 6 draftAdds ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA and drops dated approval tables. NIST
- 9 OctPolicyTreasury Board makes Canada's PQC dates policy expectationsA Security Policy Implementation Notice under the Policy on Government Security sets plans by April 2026, transition start by April 2028, high-priority systems by the end of 2031 and remaining systems by the end of 2035. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat
- 9 OctStandardICCS opens submissions for next-generation public-key algorithmsFinal submission requirements and evaluation criteria published, with a submission deadline of 30 June 2026. Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China
- 24 SeptHardwareCaltech builds a 6,100-atom neutral-atom arrayThe largest qubit array so far, not yet used for computation. Manetsch et al., Caltech
- 23 JunPolicyEU coordinated roadmap and Canada's ITSM.40.001Both set high-priority migration around 2030 to 2031 and completion by 2035. European Commission and member states
- JunHardwareHarvard, MIT and QuEra run up to 96 logical qubits on 448 atomsDistance-4 codes, well short of the distance Shor's algorithm needs at length. Bluvstein et al., Harvard, MIT and QuEra
- 30 MayStandardNSA updates the CNSA 2.0 algorithms advisoryML-KEM-1024 and ML-DSA-87, with LMS or XMSS for firmware. NSA
- 21 MayResource estimateRSA-2048 under one million qubits on the 2019 hardware modelA twentyfold drop from the 2019 estimate from algorithms and error correction alone. Google Quantum AI
- 20 MarPolicyUK NCSC publishes 2028, 2031 and 2035 milestonesDiscovery and planning, priority migration, then completion. NCSC (UK)
- 5 FebStandardChina launches the NGCC programmeA global call for public-key, hash and block cipher algorithms, run by ICCS under the Chinese Cryptography Standardization Technical Committee. Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China
- 2024
- DecPolicyCNSA 2.0 FAQ 2.1 sets enforcement dates for national security systemsEquipment and services that cannot support CNSA 2.0 are to be phased out by 31 December 2030, and CNSA 2.0 algorithms become mandatory across national security systems by 31 December 2031 unless exempted. NSA
- DecHardwareGoogle's Willow chip shows error correction below the surface code thresholdFirst experimental evidence that the noise assumptions behind these estimates are achievable. Google Quantum AI
- 12 NovStandardNIST IR 8547 draft proposes 2030 deprecation and 2035 disallowanceStill a draft; widely used as the planning baseline. NIST
- 2023
- DecHardwareIBM Condor passes 1,000 qubits1,121 superconducting qubits; IBM then shifted focus from count to quality. IBM
- AugResource estimateRegev proposes a new quantum factoring algorithmFewer gates per run at the cost of more qubits and many runs; later made space-efficient and noise-robust by Ragavan and Vaikuntanathan. Regev
- 2019
- MayResource estimateRSA-2048 in 8 hours with 20 million noisy qubitsThe reference estimate for six years. Gidney and Ekerå
- 2012
- Resource estimateSurface code estimate of around a billion qubitsFowler et al.; the starting point most comparisons use. Parker and Vermeer
Sources and verification
Every document the page draws on. Primary means the cited section of the document itself was read. Secondary means the entry rests on reporting about the document. All entries are from an initial import and still need a second reader.
| Document | Publisher | Status | Binding | Published | Verification |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3GPP, post-quantum cryptography in SA3 | 3GPP | Final | Deployment status | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| Post-quantum cryptography in eMRTDs, evaluating PAKE and PKI for travel documents (ePrint 2025/812) | Alnahawi et al. | Final | Deployment status | 2025 | Primary checked |
| ANSSI-PG-083, Règles et recommandations concernant le choix et le dimensionnement des mécanismes cryptographiques, v3.00 | ANSSI | Final | Guidance | 2026-03-20 | Primary checked |
| ANSSI views on the post-quantum transition (2022, 2023 follow-up) and PQC FAQ The FAQ states ANSSI's PQC recommendations have no regulatory force outside the regulated scope (Diffusion Restreinte, classified, security visas) | ANSSI | Final | Guidance | 2023-12-21 | Primary checked |
| Premiers visas de sécurité incluant de la cryptographie post-quantique | ANSSI | Final | Announced intention | 2025-10-16 | Primary checked |
| ANSSI views on the post-quantum cryptography transition (2023 follow-up) Follows the 2022 position paper that set out three phases for security visas | ANSSI | Final | Guidance | 2023-12-21 | Primary checked |
| APNIC blog, rolling the root key | APNIC | Final | Deployment status | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| Apple developer documentation, CryptoKit SecureEnclave | Apple | Final | Deployment status | 2025-09 | Primary checked |
| Apple Security Research, iMessage with PQ3 | Apple | Final | Deployment status | 2024-02 | Primary checked |
| ASD, Planning for post-quantum cryptography | ASD | Final | Guidance (ISM) | 2025-09-22 | Primary checked |
| Information Security Manual, Guidelines for cryptography (September 2026), OSCAL catalogue Figures are for NON-CLASSIFIED, OFFICIAL: Sensitive and PROTECTED systems (ISM-0472, 0474, 0475, 0476, 1766, 1769, 1991, 1995); SECRET and TOP SECRET require more. The 'not approved beyond 2030' statements are in the section guidance; ISM-1917 requires support for ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024, SHA-384, SHA-512 and AES-256 by 2030 | ASD | Final | Mandatory for systems assessed against the ISM | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| STIR/SHAKEN preparedness for a post-quantum transition (IPNNI-2026-00032) A study contribution to the task force, not an adopted standard | ATIS/SIP Forum IP-NNI Task Force | Final | Deployment status | 2026-03-26 | Primary checked |
| Quantum startup Atom Computing first to exceed 1,000 qubits Read from a verbatim wire reproduction because the company site blocks automated fetches | Atom Computing | Final | News | 2023-10 | Secondary only |
| AWS, KMS adds support for post-quantum ML-DSA digital signatures | AWS | Final | Deployment status | 2025-06 | Primary checked |
| Securing elliptic curve cryptocurrencies against quantum vulnerabilities (arXiv 2603.28846) | Babbush et al., Google Quantum AI with Ethereum Foundation and Stanford | Final | Preprint | 2026-03-30 | Primary checked |
| Banking System Preparedness for Cyber Risks Arising from Quantum Computing Capabilities (Supervisor of Banks letter 202501) | Bank of Israel | Final | Supervisory requirement | 2025-01-07 | Primary checked |
| Breaking Rainbow takes a weekend on a laptop | Beullens, CRYPTO 2022 (ePrint 2022/214) | Final | Research | 2022-02 | Primary checked |
| BIP 360, Pay-to-Merkle-Root | Bitcoin BIPs | Final | Deployment status | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| Architectural mechanisms of a universal fault-tolerant quantum computer (arXiv 2506.20661) | Bluvstein et al., Harvard, MIT and QuEra | Final | Research | 2025-06-25 | Primary checked |
| BSI TR-02102-1, Cryptographic Mechanisms: Recommendations and Key Lengths, version 2026-01 | BSI | Final | Guidance | 2026-01-23 | Primary checked |
| Fortschritte in der Kryptoanalyse von Classic McEliece Advises against Classic McEliece in new developments; no practical attack on the TR-02102-1 parameter sets; TR-02102-1 revision planned for early 2027 | BSI | Final | Guidance | 2026-10-01 | Primary checked |
| VS-IT: Umstellungsfristen für Post-Quanten-Kryptografie vereinbart Says binding deadlines were agreed with VS-NfD product manufacturers but publishes only the 2030 availability date | BSI | Final | Agreed with manufacturers | 2025-10-31 | Primary checked |
| Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement) | BSI, ANSSI and partner agencies from 18 EU member states | Final | Guidance | 2024-11-27 | Primary checked |
| 政府機関等における耐量子計算機暗号(PQC)への移行について(中間とりまとめ) | Cabinet Secretariat, inter-ministerial liaison council on PQC | Final | Stated target | 2025-11 | Primary checked |
| Shor's algorithm is possible with approximately 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits | Cain et al., Oratomic, Caltech and UC Berkeley | Final | Preprint | 2026-03-30 | Primary checked |
| ITSM.40.001 | Canadian Centre for Cyber Security | Final | Guidance | 2025-06-23 | Primary checked |
| An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH | Castryck and Decru, EUROCRYPT 2023 (ePrint 2022/975) | Final | Research | 2022-07 | Primary checked |
| CCN-TEC 009, Recomendaciones para una transición postcuántica segura A good-practice guide aligned with the EU roadmap; the national risk classification it refers to is not yet published | Centro Criptológico Nacional (Spain) | Final | Guidance | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| CCN-STIC 221, Guía de mecanismos criptográficos autorizados por el CCN | Centro Criptológico Nacional (Spain) | Final | Mandatory (de obligado cumplimiento) | 2025-11 | Primary checked |
| Product categories for technologies that use PQC standards Issued under EO 14306; read from the archived copy of the CISA page because cisa.gov blocks automated fetches | CISA | Final | Procurement guidance | 2026-01-23 | Primary checked |
| Post-quantum visibility (Cloudflare blog) Live figures are at radar.cloudflare.com/post-quantum | Cloudflare | Final | Telemetry | 2026-09-29 | Primary checked |
| Cloudflare Research, post-quantum key agreement | Cloudflare | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| Cloudflare changelog, post-quantum IPsec with Cisco and Fortinet | Cloudflare | Final | Deployment status | 2026-04 | Primary checked |
| Cloudflare blog, post-quantum DNSSEC on 1.1.1.1 | Cloudflare | Final | Deployment status | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| Cloudflare targets 2029 for full post-quantum security | Cloudflare | Final | Operator commitment | 2026-04-07 | Primary checked |
| CRYPTREC Ciphers List, revision LS-0001-2022R2 (ML-KEM added) | CRYPTREC (Digital Agency, MIC, METI) | Final | Government recommendation | 2026-03-30 | Primary checked |
| Quantum-Safe Migration Handbook V1 and Quantum Readiness Index Draft for consultation in October 2025; V1 of 16 July 2026 adds dated milestones for critical information infrastructure owners | Cyber Security Agency of Singapore | Final | Guidance | 2026-07-16 | Primary checked |
| HDCP Interface Independent Adaptation Specification revision 2.3 | Digital Content Protection LLC | Final | Deployment status | 2018-03-02 | Primary checked |
| Department of War Post Quantum Cryptography Strategy Dated 1 April 2026, released publicly in June 2026; dates apply 'unless otherwise noted' | DoW CIO | Final | Mandatory for scope | 2026-04-01 | Primary checked |
| Quantum-Safe Ecosystem in India: Roadmap to Quantum Resiliency States that it 'does not constitute a legal or regulatory mandate'; separate tracks for critical information infrastructure and other enterprises | DST India, National Quantum Mission | Final | Guidance | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie (annex to Kamerstuk 2026D48409) Central government aims to keep to the timeline, which may be adjusted or accelerated | Dutch cabinet | Final | Stated target | 2026-10-05 | Primary checked |
| EMVCo, quantum computing and EMV chip, what's the threat | EMVCo | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| ETSI TS 119 312 V2.1.1, Cryptographic Suites Binding only where an eIDAS implementing act, supervisory body or conformity assessment scheme references it; PQC migration deadlines deferred to a separate document under development | ETSI | Final | Technical specification | 2026-06 | Primary checked |
| Proposal amending Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), COM(2026) 13 final Adds Article 7(2)(k): national strategies to include PQC transition policies; the 2030 and 2035 dates are in recital 8 only; awaiting committee decision in Parliament as of October 2026 | European Commission | Draft | Proposed directive | 2026-01-20 | Primary checked |
| NIS Cooperation Group coordinated implementation roadmap | European Commission and member states | Final | Coordinated | 2025-06-23 | Primary checked |
| Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) Annex I requires state-of-the-art encryption of data at rest and in transit; it does not mention post-quantum cryptography | European Parliament and Council | Final | Regulation | 2024-11-20 | Primary checked |
| Will FedRAMP provide guidance on the sunsetting of FIPS 140-2? | FedRAMP | Final | Guidance | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| FIDO Alliance server requirements for WebAuthn L3 and CTAP 2.3 | FIDO Alliance | Final | Deployment status | 2026-02 | Primary checked |
| FINMA Guidance 05/2026, Quantum computing | FINMA (Switzerland) | Final | Supervisory | 2026-07-09 | Primary checked |
| FortiOS 8.0 new features, post-quantum signature authentication in IKEv2 | Fortinet | Final | Deployment status | 2026 | Primary checked |
| G7 CEG statement on a PQC roadmap for the financial sector States that it 'does not set guidance or regulatory expectations' and that its timelines are not prescriptive | G7 Cyber Expert Group | Final | Non-binding | 2026-01-13 | Primary checked |
| NZISM Version 3.9, section 2.4, Preparation for post-quantum cryptography | GCSB (New Zealand) | Final | Guidance | 2025-11 | Primary checked |
| Quasipolynomial cryptanalysis of the McEliece cryptosystem (ePrint 2026/1630) | Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain and Sun | Final | Research | 2026-08-07 | Primary checked |
| How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits | Gidney and Ekerå | Final | Academic | 2019-05 | Primary checked |
| Google Security Blog, cultivating a robust and efficient quantum-safe HTTPS | Final | Deployment status | 2026-02 | Primary checked | |
| Google Security Blog, implementing post-quantum cryptography in Android | Final | Deployment status | 2026-03 | Primary checked | |
| Quantum frontiers may be closer than they appear | Final | Operator commitment | 2026-03-25 | Primary checked | |
| Quantum supremacy using a programmable superconducting processor (Nature 574) | Google AI Quantum | Final | Research | 2019-10-23 | Primary checked |
| Cultivating a robust and efficient quantum-safe HTTPS | Google Chrome | Final | Root program | 2026-02-27 | Primary checked |
| Google Cloud KMS release notes | Google Cloud | Final | Deployment status | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers with less than a million noisy qubits | Google Quantum AI | Final | Academic | 2025-05-21 | Primary checked |
| Quantum error correction below the surface code threshold (Nature 638) | Google Quantum AI | Final | Research | 2024-12-09 | Primary checked |
| Computing 256-bit elliptic curve discrete logarithms in 26 days on a fault-tolerant trapped-ion quantum computer with 20,000 qubits Hosted by IonQ; not on arXiv at time of entry | Häner, Tripier, Young et al., IonQ | Final | Preprint, not peer-reviewed | 2026-09-03 | Primary checked |
| HKMA launches quantum preparedness whitepaper and index | Hong Kong Monetary Authority | Final | Stated aim | 2026-07-27 | Primary checked |
| IBM launches $100 million partnership toward a 100,000-qubit quantum-centric supercomputer IBM's current roadmap frames 2033 as about 2,000 logical qubits rather than restating the 100,000 physical-qubit figure | IBM | Final | Roadmap | 2023-05-21 | Primary checked |
| IBM makes quantum computing available on IBM Cloud | IBM | Final | Vendor announcement | 2016-05-04 | Primary checked |
| IBM unveils breakthrough 127-qubit quantum processor (with Falcon and Hummingbird) | IBM | Final | Vendor announcement | 2021-11-16 | Primary checked |
| IBM unveils 400 qubit-plus quantum processor | IBM | Final | Vendor announcement | 2022-11-09 | Primary checked |
| IBM Quantum System Two: the era of quantum utility is here | IBM | Final | Vendor announcement | 2023-12-04 | Primary checked |
| ICAO TRIP presentation at ID4Africa 2026 | ICAO | Final | Deployment status | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| RFC 3766: Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys | IETF | Final | Informational RFC | 2004-04 | Primary checked |
| RFC 10024, PQ/T hybrid key agreement for TLS 1.3 | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| RFC 9964, ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| RFC 9980, post-quantum cryptography in OpenPGP | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-06 | Primary checked |
| RFC 9936, use of ML-KEM in the Cryptographic Message Syntax | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-03 | Primary checked |
| RFC 10024, PQ/T hybrid key agreement for TLS 1.3 | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| RFC 9964, ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE | IETF | Final | Deployment status | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| draft-vos-cfrg-pqpake, hybrid post-quantum PAKE | IETF CFRG | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures | IETF CFRG | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| draft-google-cfrg-libzk, Longfellow ZK | IETF CFRG (individual draft) | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-emu-pqc-eap-tls, post-quantum enhancements to TLS-based EAP | IETF EMU working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem | IETF IPsecME working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA in IKEv2 | IETF IPsecME working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-mls-pq-ciphersuites | IETF MLS working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-plants-merkle-tree-certs | IETF PLANTS working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-10 | Primary checked |
| Privacy Pass interim 2026, late binding with PQ unlinkability | IETF Privacy Pass working group | Final | Deployment status | 2026-04 | Primary checked |
| draft-ietf-tls-mldsa, Use of ML-DSA in TLS 1.3 | IETF TLS working group | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-10 | Primary checked |
| Announcement on launching the Next-generation Commercial Cryptographic Algorithms Program (NGCC) | Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China | Final | Government | 2025-02-05 | Primary checked |
| Call for proposals for the next-generation public-key cryptographic algorithms | Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China | Final | Government | 2025-10-09 | Primary checked |
| NGCC round 1 candidates, public-key and hash tracks | Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China | Final | Government | 2026-09 | Primary checked |
| Instrução Normativa ITI nº 35 (DOC-ICP-01.01 v6.0) | ITI (Brazil) | Final | Regulation (permissive for PQC) | 2026-01-30 | Primary checked |
| Selecting Cryptographic Key Sizes | Journal of Cryptology | Final | Research model | 2001 | Primary checked |
| Kubernetes contributor blog, post-quantum cryptography in Kubernetes | Kubernetes | Final | Deployment status | 2025-04 | Primary checked |
| Blueprint for a microwave trapped ion quantum computer | Lekitsch et al., Science Advances | Final | Peer-reviewed | 2017-02-01 | Primary checked |
| Linkerd blog, announcing Linkerd 2.19 | Linkerd | Final | Deployment status | 2025-10 | Primary checked |
| Linphone, voice and video over IP with post-quantum encryption | Linphone | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| How to compute a 256-bit elliptic curve private key with only 50 million Toffoli gates (arXiv 2306.08585) | Litinski, PsiQuantum | Final | Research | 2023-06-14 | Primary checked |
| A tweezer array with 6,100 highly coherent atomic qubits (Nature) | Manetsch et al., Caltech | Final | News | 2025-09-24 | Primary checked |
| Microsoft Learn, ML-DSA overview for Active Directory Certificate Services | Microsoft | Final | Deployment status | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| Microsoft KB5125813, next-generation code signing for Windows | Microsoft | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| Microsoft Learn, BitLocker overview | Microsoft | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| Quantum-safe security: progress towards next-generation cryptography | Microsoft | Final | Operator commitment | 2025-08-20 | Primary checked |
| PlayReady content encryption | Microsoft | Final | Vendor documentation | 2026 | Primary checked |
| 양자보안, 더 이상 선택이 아닌 필수 (MSIT press release on PQC pilot expansion) | Ministry of Science and ICT (Korea), via KDI EIEC mirror | Final | Government programme | 2026-05-06 | Primary checked |
| Remarks by the MAS Managing Director at the MAS Annual Report 2025/2026 media conference Supervisory expectations with milestones and timelines announced for later in 2026; not yet published as of this review | Monetary Authority of Singapore | Final | Stated aim | 2026-07-28 | Primary checked |
| Firefox 146.0 release notes | Mozilla | Final | Deployment status | 2025-12 | Primary checked |
| Pelan Tindakan MyKriptografi 2026-2030 | NACSA (Malaysia) | Final | Government action plan | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography | NCSC (UK) | Final | Guidance | 2025-03-20 | Primary checked |
| NCSC, next steps in preparing for post-quantum cryptography | NCSC (UK) | Final | Deployment status | 2024-08 | Primary checked |
| Nationella rekommendationer för övergången till kvantsäker kryptografi 2026 Guidance addressed to entities covered by the Swedish Cybersecurity Act (2025:1506) | NCSC Sweden (FRA) | Final | Guidance | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
| NIAP Policy Letter #33, Post Quantum Cryptography Implementation Effective 1 January 2027; applies to products that do not meet CNSA 1.0 or CNSA 2.0 for every cryptographic function | NIAP (Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme) | Final | Mandatory for NIAP evaluation and the Product Compliant List | 2026-08-31 | Primary checked |
| PQC Transition Master Plan Plan not publicly released; 2035 and 2030 figures rest on news reporting of the 2023 announcement | NIS and MSIT (Korea) | Final | Government | 2023-07 | Secondary only |
| NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 5 Rev 6 draft (Dec 2025) drops dated tables in favour of SP 800-131A | NIST | Final | Guidance | 2020-05 | Primary checked |
| NIST IR 8547 initial public draft | NIST | Draft | Guidance | 2024-11-12 | Primary checked |
| NIST SP 800-57 Pt 1 Rev 6 initial public draft | NIST | Draft | Guidance | 2025-12-05 | Primary checked |
| NIST, PQC updates to PIV standards, working drafts | NIST | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-06 | Primary checked |
| NIST IR 8547 initial public draft | NIST | Draft | Deployment status | 2024-11 | Primary checked |
| NSA CNSA 2.0 algorithms advisory | NSA | Final | Mandatory for NSS | 2025-05-30 | Primary checked |
| NSA CNSA 2.0 FAQ, version 2.1 Version 2.1, December 2024, updated in place at this URL; read from the archived copy of the same URL because media.defense.gov blocks automated fetches | NSA | Final | Mandatory for NSS | 2024-12 | Primary checked |
| Posisjonsnotat om kvantenøkkeldistribusjon (U-26-35) | NSM (Norway) | Final | Encouragement | 2026-06-08 | Primary checked |
| Minimální požadavky na kryptografické algoritmy, verze 4.1 Approves ML-KEM-1024, ML-DSA-87 and SLH-DSA standalone, and lattice, FrodoKEM and Classic McEliece schemes in hybrid | NÚKIB (Czech Republic) | Final | Guidance obliged entities must take into account | 2026-03-04 | Primary checked |
| Kvantová hrozba a kvantově odolná kryptografie (annex to the minimum requirements) English translation: https://nukib.gov.cz/download/publications_en/Annex%20to%20the%20document_Minimum%20Requirements%20for%20Cryptographic%20Algorithms.pdf | NÚKIB (Czech Republic) | Final | Guidance obliged entities must take into account | 2026-03 | Primary checked |
| OMB M-26-15, Execution of the Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography Plans due 120 days from 24 June 2026; phases use 'should', the 2030 objective and plan submission use 'must'; does not apply to national security systems | OMB | Final | Mandatory for scope | 2026-06-24 | Primary checked |
| OpenSSH release notes | OpenSSH | Final | Deployment status | 2025-04 | Primary checked |
| OpenSSL 3.5 release notes | OpenSSL | Final | Software release | 2025-04-08 | Primary checked |
| Oracle, securing Oracle AI Database 26ai for the quantum era | Oracle | Final | Deployment status | 2025-10 | Primary checked |
| Estimating the energy requirements to operate a CRQC (RAND), table of earlier estimates | Parker and Vermeer | Final | Academic | 2023-04 | Primary checked |
| Quantinuum announces commercial launch of Helios | Quantinuum | Final | Vendor announcement | 2025-11-05 | Primary checked |
| Computing with many encoded logical qubits beyond break-even (arXiv 2602.22211) | Quantinuum | Final | Research | 2026-02-25 | Primary checked |
| An efficient quantum factoring algorithm (arXiv 2308.06572) Refined for space and noise by Ragavan and Vaikuntanathan, arXiv 2310.00899 | Regev | Final | Research | 2023-08-12 | Primary checked |
| Bit operation cost of holdout key-recovery attacks against Classic McEliece (ePrint 2026/1786) 2^126.77 bit operations for mceliece348864, conditional; all five sets below their claimed category | Saarinen | Final | Research | 2026-08-24 | Primary checked |
| Signal blog, Signal Protocol and post-quantum ratchets | Signal | Final | Deployment status | 2025-10 | Primary checked |
| The PQXDH key agreement protocol | Signal | Final | Deployment status | 2023 | Primary checked |
| SPIFFE blog, the SPIFFE standard roadmap | SPIFFE | Final | Deployment status | 2026-08 | Primary checked |
| Neutral-atom quantum computing, Oratomic's $300M bet | Supercomputing News | Final | News | 2026-07 | Secondary only |
| Thales TCT, Luna T-Series FIPS 140-3 validation | Thales TCT | Final | Deployment status | 2026-07 | Primary checked |
| Executive Order 14412 Section 4(b): HVAs and high impact systems, excluding national security systems. Section 6(c): FAR Council to publish a proposed rule within 180 days; binds no contractor directly | The White House | Final | Mandatory for scope | 2026-06-22 | Primary checked |
| Executive Order 14306 | The White House | Final | Mandatory for agencies | 2025-06-06 | Primary checked |
| Trail of Bits, building cryptographic agility into Sigstore | Trail of Bits | Final | Deployment status | 2026-01 | Primary checked |
| Security Policy Implementation Notice: Migrating the Government of Canada to post-quantum cryptography Applies to organizations under section 6 of the Policy on Government Security, for systems up to Protected B; uses 'will', 'must' and 'are expected to' | Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat | Final | Policy expectation under the Policy on Government Security | 2025-10-09 | Primary checked |
| TCG, TPM 2.0 library v1.85 post-quantum announcement | Trusted Computing Group | Final | Deployment status | 2026-03 | Primary checked |
| UEFI Forum, post-quantum cryptography specification updates whitepaper | UEFI Forum | Final | Deployment status | 2026-04 | Primary checked |
| Department of War suspends CMMC Phase II requirements | US Department of War | Final | Policy | 2026-07-13 | Primary checked |
| W3C, quantum-resistant cryptosuites v1.0, first public working draft | W3C | Draft | Deployment status | 2026-06 | Primary checked |
| WebRTC 1.0, generateCertificate | W3C | Final | Deployment status | 2026 | Primary checked |
| UAE announces approval of National Encryption Policy, issuance of executive regulation Read through verbatim wire syndication because the WAM page could not be fetched; policy and regulation texts are not public; no deadline announced | WAM (UAE news agency) | Final | Government | 2025-11-27 | Secondary only |
| The Pinnacle architecture (arXiv 2602.11457) | Webster et al., Iceberg Quantum | Final | Preprint | 2026-02-12 | Primary checked |
| Improving GIJS key recovery for Classic McEliece (ePrint 2026/1984) 'None of this is close to practical' | Weis | Final | Research | 2026-09-11 | Primary checked |
| WhatsApp Encryption Overview, technical white paper version 9 | Final | Deployment status | 2026-02-25 | Primary checked | |
| Factoring 2048 bit RSA integers with a half-million-qubit modular atomic processor | Xue and Covey | Final | Preprint | 2026-05 | Primary checked |
Other cryptographic requirements
Key sizes are only part of what an assessor asks about. These frameworks also set requirements on inventory, key management, protocol versions, certificate lifetimes and the ability to change algorithms, and they increasingly overlap with the post-quantum work. Each cell says what the framework requires, with the clause it comes from.
Cryptography is now a dependency of every system you run, in the same way networking, storage, compute and databases are. Authentication, encryption at rest and encryption in transit all rest on it, and every use of it rests on keys that someone has to manage. These frameworks exist to make that underlying obligation visible. Because each one has to cover every kind of system its scope touches, the wording is broad and open to interpretation.
The way to read them is as questions about systems you have already thought through: what the system protects, which properties it needs (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity), where it uses cryptography to get them, and who holds the keys. Applied to that understanding, each requirement has a concrete meaning. Applied without it, the same requirements collapse into a checklist, and a checklist that has to span every system at once is too shallow to tell you whether anything is actually protected.
So treat the matrix as part of how you manage risk, not as the whole of how you manage cryptographic risk. Passing every cell is a minimum bar. The deadlines on the PQC transition tab are the clearest example: an inventory requirement means nothing until you know which keys and protocols the inventory has to reach.
Control matrix
What each framework asks of you in eight areas of cryptographic practice, and how firmly it asks.
Rows are control areas, columns are frameworks. Select a row name for what that control area is for, and a cell for the full requirement and its source. Switch off the frameworks that do not apply to you, and scroll sideways to see the rest.
| Control area | PCI DSS v4.0.1 | NIS2 and EU 2024/2690 | DORA RTS | CA/B Forum TLS BRs | US federal (NIST, FISMA) | FedRAMP | CMMC and NIST SP 800-171 | ISO/IEC 27001 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Approved algorithms and strengths | Strong cryptography, at least 112-bit effective strength | Policy must name approved protocols and algorithms | Selection criteria based on leading practices and standards | RSA 2048+ or ECDSA P-256, P-384, P-521 | FIPS-validated cryptography; PQC FIPS on a deadline | FIPS 140-validated or NSA-approved modules | FIPS-validated cryptography for CUI | Organization sets its own rules |
| Protocol versions | Strong protocols for card data over open networks | Approved protocols named in the policy | Encryption of data at rest, in transit and in use | Not in scope | TLS 1.3 across federal systems | Transmission protection through validated modules | Encrypt CUI in transit and at rest | Covered by the organization's rules |
| Cryptographic inventory | Two inventories, mandatory since 31 March 2025 | Implied through asset management | Flows from asset classification | Not in scope | Cryptographic inventories under OMB M-23-02 | Modules and certificates listed in the SSP | Validation evidence in the SSP | Implied by the rules and asset controls |
| Monitoring and ability to change algorithms | Monitor viability and hold a response plan | Crypto agility expected in the policy | Update cryptographic technology as cryptanalysis develops | Shorter lifetimes are the agility mechanism | Dated migration to post-quantum algorithms | FIPS 140-2 to 140-3 transition | Module transitions handled as deficiencies | Rules reviewed as threats change |
| Key management | Key lifecycle controls for stored account data | Key lifecycle, including expiry dates | Dedicated key management article | Key protection and compromise rules for CAs | NIST key management guidance | Key establishment and management control | Establish and manage keys | Full key lifecycle |
| Certificate lifetime and validation | Certificates must be valid, not expired or revoked | Covered by key lifespan rules | Covered by key lifecycle rules | 200 days now, 100 in 2027, 47 in 2029 | No general federal maximum | PKI certificates under SC-17 | Not covered | Part of key lifecycle |
| Governance and review | Annual documented review | Documented policy, management accountability | Board-approved policy, recorded exceptions | Audit against the requirements | Named migration lead and reporting | Authorization and continuous monitoring | Self-assessment in force; certification paused | Topic-specific policy, audited |
| Post-quantum obligation | Through the viability and response clauses | State of the art, plus ENISA guidance | Recital names quantum advancements | No PQ profile yet | Dated and binding | Through validated PQC modules and EO 14412 | Through the DoW PQC strategy | Not mentioned |
Approved algorithms and strengths
Decides which algorithms and key sizes count as protection at all. An algorithm below the bar gives the appearance of confidentiality or integrity without the substance, so this is the floor every other control rests on.
Protocol versions
Protocols are where algorithms meet the network, and an old protocol version can undo a strong algorithm through downgrade, weak negotiation or known flaws. This asks that the versions in use are the ones that still deliver the properties you chose the algorithms for.
Cryptographic inventory
You cannot manage keys, rotate certificates or replace an algorithm you do not know you depend on. An inventory is the record of where cryptography is used, with which algorithms and keys, and it is the prerequisite for every other row and for any post-quantum plan.
Monitoring and ability to change algorithms
Algorithms are retired on a schedule set by cryptanalysis and policy, not by your roadmap. This asks whether you watch for that and can change an algorithm or key size in a system without rebuilding it, which is what the post-quantum migration will test.
Key management
Every use of cryptography is only as strong as the handling of its keys. Generation, storage, access, rotation and destruction decide whether a correctly chosen algorithm protects anything, which is why this row applies to every system in the inventory.
Certificate lifetime and validation
Certificates bind keys to identities, and their lifetime bounds how long a compromised or mis-issued one keeps working. Shorter lifetimes and working revocation limit that exposure, and they only hold up if issuance and renewal are automated.
Governance and review
Someone has to own the policy, review it as algorithms and threats change, and be able to show that the other rows are actually in effect. Without that, each control decays to whatever the last engineer left in place.
Post-quantum obligation
Public-key algorithms in use today will be broken by a large quantum computer, and data recorded now can be decrypted then. This row collects the frameworks that already name a post-quantum obligation; the dates themselves are on the PQC transition tab.
Frameworks
- PCI DSS v4.0.1, PCI Security Standards Council. Anyone storing, processing or transmitting payment card data. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
- NIS2 and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, European Union. Essential and important entities; the implementing regulation binds digital infrastructure and digital providers. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
- DORA RTS, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774, European Union. EU financial entities and their ICT providers.
- CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements, CA/Browser Forum. Publicly trusted TLS certificates only; private PKI is out of scope.
- US federal baseline (FISMA, NIST SP 800-53 and EO 14412), United States. Federal agencies and, through the FAR, their contractors. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
- FedRAMP Rev5 baseline and cryptographic module policy, FedRAMP. Cloud services sold to US federal agencies. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
- CMMC Level 2 and NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2, US Department of War and NIST. Defence contractors handling controlled unclassified information. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A 8.24, ISO and IEC. Organizations certified to ISO/IEC 27001. Entries rest partly on secondary reporting.
Questions and background
Why key sizes change, what a cryptoperiod is, why post-quantum migration starts now, and how to read the rest of the site. Each answer links to the sources behind it.
The basics
Why does key length matter at all?
Every cryptographic key can in principle be recovered by an attacker with enough computing time. Key length sets how much time that is. For a well-designed algorithm, each extra bit of security doubles the work an attacker has to do, so the difference between 112-bit and 128-bit security is a factor of about 65,000 in attack cost.
The difficulty is that attack cost keeps falling. Computers get faster and cheaper, and researchers find better attacks on the underlying mathematics. A key that was comfortably out of reach when it was generated can drift within reach while the data it protects still matters. Choosing a key length is choosing how far ahead of that curve you want to stay.
Sources: NIST. See also: Key length.
What does “acceptable through 2030” actually mean?
It is a statement about probability under stated assumptions, not a guarantee. When an authority says a key size is acceptable through a given year, it means that under its current assumptions about attacker computing power, the growth of that power and progress in cryptanalysis, the expected cost of breaking the key stays above an acceptable threshold until then.
If the assumptions change, the date changes. That is why the figures are revised, why different authorities publish different numbers, and why this site records the edition and date of every figure it shows.
What is a cryptoperiod?
A cryptoperiod is the span of time during which a specific key is authorized for use. NIST divides it into the originator-usage period, during which a key may be used to encrypt or sign, and the recipient-usage period, during which data protected with it may still be decrypted or verified. The second is usually longer, because data encrypted on the last day of use still has to be readable afterwards.
A cryptoperiod limits the damage if the assumptions behind a key turn out to be wrong. It caps how much data a single compromised key exposes, how long an attacker has to work on a key while it is still in use, and how long the key sits in systems and backups where it can leak for reasons that have nothing to do with mathematics.
The right cryptoperiod depends on the setting as much as the algorithm. Sensitive or high-volume data, keys held in software rather than hardware, and keys handled by many people or systems all argue for shorter periods. Shorter periods only help if the organization can actually rotate keys that often without outages, which is why automation matters.
Sources: NIST.
Which year should I enter on the key length page?
Enter the last year the data must stay secure, not the year the key stops being used. For confidentiality, that is the end of the recipient-usage period plus the time the data must remain secret. A key used for one year to encrypt records that must stay confidential for twenty years needs to be sized for twenty-one years.
For signatures, it is the last year anyone needs to rely on the signature being genuine. Signatures can often be renewed by re-signing or timestamping while the old algorithm is still trusted, so the horizon is usually shorter than for encryption.
See also: Key length.
Why do different authorities give different numbers?
They start from different assumptions and different missions. NIST sets minimums for US federal systems and moves in fixed steps of security strength. BSI and ANSSI build in more margin and set their own horizons. NSA's CNSA 2.0 protects national security systems and asks for the largest parameter sets.
None of them is wrong. The practical question is which of them applies to you, which is why the key length page puts your chosen rules first and shows the strictest figure among them.
Sources: NIST, BSI, ANSSI, NSA. See also: Key length.
Concepts
What does “bits of security” mean?
Security strength is a way of comparing very different algorithms on one scale. An algorithm offers n bits of security when the best known attack takes about 2 to the power n operations, the same as trying every key of an ideal n-bit cipher.
This is why a 128-bit AES key, a 3072-bit RSA key and a 256-bit elliptic-curve key are treated as roughly equivalent. They have very different sizes, but NIST rates all three at about 128 bits of security because the best attacks against each take about the same effort.
Sources: NIST.
What is the difference between symmetric and public-key cryptography?
Symmetric cryptography, such as AES, uses the same secret key to encrypt and decrypt. It is fast and its key size maps directly onto its security, so a 128-bit key gives about 128 bits of security. The limitation is that both sides need the key before they can talk.
Public-key cryptography, such as RSA and elliptic curves, uses a key pair. The public half can be shared openly and the private half stays secret. It solves the problem of agreeing on keys with someone you have never met, and it makes digital signatures possible. Its keys are much larger for the same security because it rests on mathematical problems that have faster attacks than trying every key. Almost every secure connection uses public-key cryptography to agree on a symmetric key and then symmetric cryptography for the data itself.
What is the factoring modulus?
RSA's security rests on factoring. The public key contains a large number, the modulus, made by multiplying two secret prime numbers together. Multiplying them is easy, but recovering the two primes from the product is extremely hard for large numbers, and anyone who can do it can derive the private key.
The modulus size, 2048 or 3072 bits, is what the key length tables mean by RSA key size. Factoring algorithms improve steadily, which is why RSA keys have to be much larger than symmetric keys for the same security. A 2048-bit modulus gives about 112 bits of security and a 3072-bit modulus about 128.
Sources: NIST. See also: Key length.
What are the two numbers for discrete logarithm keys?
Classic Diffie-Hellman and DSA work in a group of numbers modulo a large prime, and their security rests on the discrete logarithm problem, which is recovering an exponent from the result of repeated multiplication. Two sizes matter. The first is the size of the prime that defines the group, written first in the tables. The second is the size of the subgroup the computations actually use.
Each size defends against a different kind of attack. The best attacks on the whole group scale like factoring, so the group prime needs to be about as large as an RSA modulus. Generic attacks on the subgroup take roughly the square root of its size, so the subgroup needs about twice as many bits as the security target. That is why the tables show pairs such as 3072 and 256.
Sources: NIST, ANSSI. See also: Key length.
Why are elliptic-curve keys so much shorter than RSA keys?
Elliptic-curve cryptography uses the discrete logarithm problem on the points of a curve instead of on numbers modulo a prime. No attack is known that exploits the structure of well-chosen curves the way factoring algorithms exploit RSA, so the best classical attacks are generic and take about the square root of the group size.
That means a curve needs about twice as many bits as the security target, so a 256-bit curve gives about 128 bits of security, compared with 3072 bits for RSA. The smaller keys and signatures are why elliptic curves took over most of the web. They are just as vulnerable to a quantum computer as RSA, however, because Shor's algorithm solves the elliptic-curve discrete logarithm too.
Sources: NIST. See also: Key length.
Why do hash functions need twice the output size?
A hash function turns any input into a fixed-size fingerprint. The most demanding property is collision resistance, meaning nobody can find two different inputs with the same fingerprint. Because of the birthday effect, finding some collision takes only about the square root of the number of possible outputs, so a 256-bit hash gives about 128 bits of collision resistance.
Finding an input that matches a particular given fingerprint is much harder and takes about the full output size. Signatures and certificates depend on collision resistance, which is why the tables pair a 256-bit hash with 128-bit security.
Sources: BSI. See also: Key length.
What is a KEM, and how is it different from Diffie-Hellman?
A key encapsulation mechanism, or KEM, is how the new post-quantum algorithms establish a shared secret. One side publishes a public key. The other side uses it to generate a random secret together with a ciphertext that only the holder of the private key can open, and sends the ciphertext back. Both sides end up with the same secret, which then keys the symmetric encryption.
Diffie-Hellman reaches the same result differently, with both sides contributing a public value and combining it with their own private value. Protocols such as TLS 1.3 can carry either, which is why ML-KEM could be added to TLS as a new key exchange option without redesigning the protocol.
Sources: NIST.
What are lattice, hash-based and code-based algorithms?
They are families of post-quantum algorithms named after the mathematical problem their security rests on. None of these problems has a known efficient quantum attack.
Lattice-based algorithms rest on problems about finding short vectors in high-dimensional grids. ML-KEM for key establishment and ML-DSA for signatures are both lattice-based, fast and compact, which is why they are the main standards. FrodoKEM uses a less structured lattice, which is slower and larger but considered more conservative, and BSI and ANSSI both recommend it.
Hash-based signatures, such as SLH-DSA, LMS and XMSS, rest only on the security of hash functions, which is very well understood. Their signatures are large, so they suit uses such as firmware signing where size matters less than confidence.
Code-based algorithms rest on the difficulty of decoding error-correcting codes. Classic McEliece has decades of analysis behind it but public keys of hundreds of kilobytes or more. HQC was selected by NIST in 2025 as a backup key establishment standard based on a different problem from ML-KEM.
Sources: BSI, ANSSI. See also: Algorithm sizes.
What does stateful mean for LMS and XMSS?
LMS and XMSS build a signature key out of a large number of one-time keys, and each one may only ever be used once. The signer has to keep track of which have been used, which is the state. If the state is lost or copied, for example by restoring a backup or cloning a virtual machine, a one-time key can be reused and security fails.
That makes them unsuitable for general use but a good fit for tightly controlled signing, such as software and firmware updates signed from a hardware module. CNSA 2.0 requires them for exactly that. SLH-DSA is the stateless alternative, at the cost of larger signatures.
Sources: NSA.
What are NIST's post-quantum security categories?
NIST rates post-quantum parameter sets against the effort to break AES or SHA of a given size, rather than in bits. Category 1 is at least as hard to break as finding an AES-128 key, category 3 matches AES-192 and category 5 matches AES-256. Categories 2 and 4 are defined by collision search on SHA-256 and SHA-384.
The number in a parameter set name usually indicates its category. ML-KEM-512, 768 and 1024 are categories 1, 3 and 5, and ML-DSA-44, 65 and 87 are categories 2, 3 and 5. Authorities that want more margin, such as CNSA 2.0, require the category 5 sets.
What are Shor's and Grover's algorithms?
They are the two quantum algorithms that matter for cryptography. Shor's algorithm solves factoring and discrete logarithms efficiently, which breaks RSA, Diffie-Hellman and elliptic curves completely rather than weakening them. No increase in key size fixes that, which is why those algorithms have to be replaced.
Grover's algorithm speeds up brute-force search, in theory halving the effective size of a symmetric key. In practice the attack has to run as one very long sequential computation and parallelises poorly, so the real reduction is much smaller. That is why symmetric keys and hash functions need little or no change.
See also: Quantum estimates.
What is the difference between physical and logical qubits?
Physical qubits are the actual hardware elements, and they make errors far too often to run a long computation directly. Error correction combines many physical qubits into one logical qubit that behaves reliably. The more physical qubits per logical qubit, measured by the code distance, the lower the error rate.
A cryptographically relevant attack needs on the order of a thousand or more logical qubits running reliably for hours or days. The estimates on this site count physical qubits, which is why they run from hundreds of thousands to millions, and why a device announced with a few dozen logical qubits at a small code distance is still a long way from that.
See also: Quantum estimates.
Is the algorithm usually the weak point?
Seldom, in practice. Keys are lost far more often than they are broken. The common failures are a key read out of memory through a bug in the software around it, a key copied from a server, backup or developer machine, a signing service used as an oracle by whoever has gained access to it, and a random number generator that never produced a proper key in the first place. None of those depends on the key size, and none is fixed by a larger one.
Algorithms do fall to mathematics, but the breaks of widely deployed ones (MD5, SHA-1, RC4, 512-bit RSA) arrived gradually, with years of published warning, which is exactly what key-size guidance exists to track. The sudden breaks have come in young schemes. Two post-quantum candidates in the NIST process fell to classical attacks in 2022, SIKE in about an hour on a single core and Rainbow in a weekend on a laptop. In 2026 several research groups published key-recovery cost estimates for Classic McEliece below its claimed security levels, and on 1 October BSI advised against using it in new developments, while noting that no practical attack exists on the parameters it recommends and that hybrid use still gives at least classical security. Young algorithms do fail, which is why the guidance on this site favours the standardised ones and hybrid deployment.
That is the division of labour between the key size figures and the cryptoperiods on this site. The key size sets the cost of the one attack that needs no access to your systems. The cryptoperiod bounds how much is exposed when the ordinary thing happens and a key leaks. The effective security of a key in use depends on how it is generated, stored, accessed and retired at least as much as on the mathematics, and a sound key size with careless handling protects less than a modest one held in hardware with a short life.
Sources: NIST, Castryck and Decru, EUROCRYPT 2023 (ePrint 2022/975), Beullens, CRYPTO 2022 (ePrint 2022/214), BSI, Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain and Sun, Saarinen, Weis. See also: See the chart.
What is a CRQC?
A cryptographically relevant quantum computer is one able to run Shor's algorithm at the scale needed to break keys in real use, such as RSA-2048 or a 256-bit elliptic curve. No such machine is known to exist.
Estimates of when one might exist vary widely, and for planning purposes the date matters less than two other numbers, which are how long your data must stay secret and how long your migration will take. If those two add up to more than the time until a CRQC exists, the data is at risk.
See also: Quantum estimates.
Post-quantum
No one has a quantum computer that can break RSA. Why act now?
Because data can be recorded today and decrypted later. An attacker who captures encrypted traffic now and stores it only needs a capable quantum computer at some point before the data stops mattering. If records must stay confidential for ten years and a capable machine arrives in eight, they are already exposed, even though nothing can break them today.
Migration also takes years. Inventories, protocol changes, hardware refresh cycles and supplier updates mean that organizations starting when a machine is announced will be too late. The published estimates of what such a machine needs have fallen sharply, from about 20 million qubits in 2019 to under a million in 2025 on the same hardware assumptions, and further on other architectures.
Sources: Google Quantum AI, Gidney and Ekerå. See also: Quantum estimates.
Why does key establishment come before signatures?
Encrypted data can't be protected retroactively. If the key exchange behind a recorded session is broken later, the session is exposed, and nothing done afterwards changes that. A signature that authenticates a live connection or a sign-in is different. It is checked once, so it only needs to hold until it is replaced, and a forged one is only useful while the old algorithm is still trusted.
Signatures that are checked again years later need more care. Signed documents, software releases, firmware and archived evidence keep being validated long after they were signed, and once forgery is possible a verifier can no longer tell an original from a forgery made later. Keeping them verifiable means applying trusted timestamps while the old algorithm is still sound, preserving the validation evidence, or re-signing with a post-quantum algorithm before the old one fails. Firmware is the hardest case, because the key that verifies it is often fixed in hardware shipping today, which is why CNSA 2.0 sets one of its earliest dates for software and firmware signing.
That asymmetry is why US federal policy requires post-quantum key establishment for high value assets and high impact systems by the end of 2030 and signatures a year later, and why most national timelines follow the same order.
Sources: The White House, NSA. See also: Deadlines.
What is hybrid cryptography, and why do BSI and ANSSI require it?
A hybrid scheme combines a classical algorithm such as ECDH with a post-quantum one such as ML-KEM, so that an attacker has to break both. The post-quantum algorithms are much newer and have had far less scrutiny. Hybrid protects against the possibility that one of them turns out to be weaker than expected, while still protecting against a quantum computer.
The most widely deployed example is X25519MLKEM768 in TLS 1.3, which runs an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman exchange and an ML-KEM encapsulation in the same handshake and combines both results into the session key. It is already the default in current browsers and major TLS libraries, and it accounts for most of the post-quantum traffic measured on the web.
BSI and ANSSI both require post-quantum key establishment to be used in hybrid form. ANSSI allows hash-based signatures such as SLH-DSA to be used alone, because their security rests on well-understood hash functions. NSA takes a different view and requires CNSA 2.0 algorithms on their own once the transition dates pass.
Do symmetric keys and hashes also need to change?
Much less. The quantum algorithm that breaks RSA and elliptic curves, Shor's algorithm, has no counterpart against symmetric ciphers and hash functions. The best known quantum attack on them, Grover's algorithm, gives a much smaller speed-up that is also hard to run in practice.
NIST continues to treat AES-128 as acceptable, while CNSA 2.0 requires AES-256 and SHA-384 or SHA-512 for national security systems. The large changes are all on the public-key side.
Why do the quantum estimates keep falling?
Two things improve at once. Better algorithms reduce how many logical qubits and operations an attack needs, and better error correction reduces how many physical qubits each logical qubit costs. The 2019 to 2025 drop for RSA-2048 came entirely from those improvements on unchanged hardware assumptions.
The 2026 estimates go further by assuming different hardware, such as neutral atoms or error-correcting codes that need richer connectivity. Gidney's figure of under a million qubits assumes superconducting qubits on a planar grid with nearest-neighbour connections, the most constrained case. Neutral-atom estimates need around ten thousand qubits because atoms can be moved and connected more freely, but they run about a thousand times slower. At around ten thousand qubits the attack would run for decades, and bringing it down to about three months takes about a hundred thousand. Qubit counts are therefore only comparable within one hardware type, which is why the chart colours estimates and devices by hardware type and only joins estimates made under the same hardware model.
Sources: Google Quantum AI, Gidney and Ekerå. See also: Quantum estimates.
Deadlines and rules
Which deadline applies to me?
Usually more than one. A company can be bound by its national government, its sector regulator, the jurisdictions of its customers and the requirements of the standards it certifies against. The practical answer is to plan against the earliest deadline among those that actually apply to your systems, which the transition page shows once you select your jurisdictions.
Read the scope carefully. Many dates apply only to government systems, high-value assets or critical infrastructure, and a date that does not bind you directly may still reach you through procurement requirements.
See also: Deadlines.
What is the difference between mandatory, guidance and a stated target?
A mandatory requirement binds its scope through law, regulation or procurement, and failing it has consequences. Guidance is advice from an authority without direct enforcement, although regulators and auditors often treat it as the expected standard. A stated target is a goal a government has announced without a mechanism to enforce it.
The classification follows the one the Hong Kong Monetary Authority used in its comparison of national programmes, and it is shown next to every jurisdiction on the timeline.
Sources: Hong Kong Monetary Authority. See also: Deadlines.
Why is China treated differently?
China is standardising its own post-quantum algorithms rather than adopting the NIST set, as it did with SM2, SM3 and SM4. Its programme published round 1 candidates in September 2026, with 84 public-key and 35 hash algorithms, and no migration deadline yet.
For organizations operating in China, that means a second set of algorithms on a different schedule, and parameter choices that will not map directly onto ML-KEM and ML-DSA.
Sources: Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China, Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards, China. See also: Deadlines.
Operations
What is crypto agility, and why do regulators ask for it?
Crypto agility is the ability to change algorithms, key sizes or protocols without redesigning the systems that use them. It matters because every recommendation on this site will change again. A system that can swap algorithms by configuration can follow the next revision. A system with algorithms fixed in hardware, firmware or data formats has to be rebuilt.
Regulators have started to require it directly. DORA requires financial entities to have provisions for updating cryptographic technology as cryptanalysis develops, NIS2's implementing regulation expects it in the cryptographic policy, and PCI DSS requires a documented plan to respond to anticipated changes in cryptographic vulnerabilities.
See also: Other requirements.
Why is everyone asking for a cryptographic inventory?
Because you can't migrate what you can't find. Cryptography is embedded in applications, libraries, devices, certificates and third-party services, and most organizations don't know where all of it is. An inventory records which algorithms, key sizes, protocols and certificates are used where, and for what.
PCI DSS has required an inventory of cipher suites and protocols since March 2025, US federal agencies have maintained inventories of quantum-vulnerable systems since 2022, and most national migration plans make an inventory the first milestone.
See also: Other requirements.
Why are TLS certificates getting shorter?
Shorter validity limits how long a mis-issued or compromised certificate stays useful, and it forces automation. Once renewal is automatic, changing key types or algorithms becomes a configuration change that propagates within one certificate lifetime, which is the web PKI's form of crypto agility.
Maximum validity for publicly trusted TLS certificates fell to 200 days in March 2026 and will fall to 100 days in March 2027 and 47 days in March 2029.
See also: Other requirements.
What is FIPS 140 validation, and why isn't using AES enough?
FIPS 140 is the US standard for cryptographic modules, the hardware or software that actually implements the algorithms. NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program tests modules against it and publishes certificates. FedRAMP, CMMC and federal systems require validated modules, not just approved algorithms, because a correct algorithm can still be implemented badly.
The standard is in transition. All FIPS 140-2 certificates moved to historical status on 21 September 2026, so new federal procurements depend on FIPS 140-3 certificates, and many modules are still waiting in the validation queue. Post-quantum algorithms follow the same path, since they can only be used in these regimes once validated modules implementing them exist.
Sources: FedRAMP. See also: Other requirements.
About the data
Where does the data come from, and how do I know it's right?
Every figure links to the document it comes from, and every source is marked by how it was checked. Primary means the cited section of the document itself was read. Secondary means the entry rests on reporting about the document and still needs checking.
The distinction matters. Checking against primary documents has already corrected errors that were repeated across widely cited summaries, including the number of the US executive order and what BSI actually requires for hybrid key establishment. Surveys and trackers from firms that sell post-quantum products are treated as leads, not evidence.
See also: Sources.
How is the site kept current?
New findings and rules go into the developments log first, with their source, and are folded into the tables and charts once they have been checked. Every section shows the date it was last reviewed. The data is published as open JSON under CC BY 4.0 so that anyone can check it, build on it or send corrections.
See also: Developments log.
What happened to the old Lenstra and RFC key-size calculators?
The original keylength.com included equation-based estimators from Lenstra and Verheul and RFC 3766. They are useful historical models: a reader can change assumptions about attacker budgets, hardware prices, computing growth and cryptanalytic progress, then estimate an equivalent public-key size or protection year.
This site does not mix those outputs into the current-requirements table. They are models built from explicit assumptions, not current policy, and their defaults predate today's hardware and the post-quantum transition. The current table instead shows dated figures from active authorities and links each one to its source. A future archival calculator could reproduce the historical equations with their assumptions and publication dates clearly exposed.
Sources: Journal of Cryptology, IETF. See also: See the chart.